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It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths 
can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of 
our beliefs are only approximately true, and therefore false, they do not count as 
knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We 
propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, 
practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the 
skeptical challenge, this view also coheres with several previous theoretical proposals in 
epistemology. 

















Knowledge and Truth: A Skeptical Challenge 
 
The human organism is, from the point of view of physics, a certain kind of measuring 
apparatus. As such it has certain inherent limitations. – Bas C. Van Fraassen 
 
Human beings are limited creatures. Despite our best efforts, there are many things that 
we will never fully observe, represent, calculate, or measure. For example, scientists will 
probably never directly observe quarks or measure the precise size or age of the universe. 
In these and other matters, often the best they can do is rely on approximation. For 
example, scientists at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory use the fifteen-digit number 
“3.141592653589793” as an approximate value of pi, even though it is, strictly speaking, 
not the actual value of pi. They also estimate the age of the universe as approximately 
13.8 billion years, give or take a few million years. Such limitations have long been 
discussed by philosophers of science, who acknowledge that “measurement is nothing 
more or less than controlled or regulated estimation” (Trout 2003: 45-46) and that 
“science does not aim at establishing immutable truths and eternal dogmas: its aim is to 
approach the truth by successive approximations, without claiming that at any stage final 
and complete accuracy has been achieved” (Russell 1925 [1958]: 100). 
 Approximation is also ubiquitous in everyday life, though it is considerably less 
accurate outside of NASA. When representing, observing, and measuring things, we 
frequently approximate distances, spatial orientations, trajectories, speeds, sizes, colors, 
temperatures, dates, and times. For example, the representation that a mile equals 1.6 
kilometers, that my mailbox is 2 feet from the curb, that 16 ounces of water was added to 




the recipe, that 2 blue shirts are the same shade, that the current temperature is 75 degrees 
Fahrenheit outside, or that the current time is 9:03 are all common approximations. These 
representations closely approximate the truth, but they are not strictly true. For example, 
my mailbox is actually not 2 feet from the curb (it’s 1.95 feet), I didn’t add 16 ounces of 
water to the mixture (I added 15.90), and it is not 9:03 (it’s 9:02:58). And while the use of 
everyday measurement tools, such as clocks, rulers, or kitchen scales may sometimes 
allow the more litigious, punctual, or epicurean among us to make very accurate 
representations of these things, in practice, measurement error all but guarantees that such 
representations will always be only approximate. 
Given these limitations, the question arises: do the same limitations extend to 
what humans know? According to a leading theory of knowledge, knowledge is factive, 
meaning that only truths can be known (e.g. Audi 1998; BonJour 2002; Chisholm 1989; 
Davidson 1988; Feldman 2003; Fumerton 2006; Greco 2010; Pritchard 2006; Sartwell 
1992; Sosa 1991; Williamson 2000; Zagzebski 2009). However, if knowledge requires 
strict truth, and approximations are not strictly true, then it is not possible to know 
approximations. Let this be the skeptical challenge for factive knowledge: 
1. A representation is known only if it is strictly true. (premise) 
2. Approximations are not strictly true. (premise) 
3. Therefore approximations are not known. (from 1 and 2) 
4. Many of our representations are mere approximations. (premise) 
5. Therefore many of our representations are not known. (from 3 and 4) 
Epistemologists may be willing to grant that some, perhaps even many, of our 
representations are ordinarily not known. But given the ubiquity of approximation in 




personal, professional and public life, the extent of ignorance implied by this argument is 
noteworthy. To begin appreciating the skeptical challenge it poses, consider the sheer 
number of things we represent approximately and thus, according to this argument, would 
no longer know. For instance, I do not know that my mailbox is the distance from the 
curb I thought it was, that I added the amount of water to the recipe I thought I did, or 
that the current temperature or the current time is what I thought it was. In light of the 
fact that usually the best we do is merely approximate the truth, the requirement of strict 
truth could undermine much of what we ordinarily take ourselves to know.  
 There are several potential responses to this skeptical argument. A first response 
rejects the premise that many of our representations about the world are merely 
approximations of what the world is like (i.e. line 4). This response appears to be a non-
starter for several reasons. First, limitations of measurement are well known. Even the 
most astute or careful measurements are bound to merely approximate values that a more 
discerning instrument might later detect. Second, ordinary discourse and measurement 
are far less discerning than professional scientific measurement. We frequently “round 
off” such details in the course of daily life. 
A second response denies the premise that approximations are not strictly true 
(i.e. line 2). One way to deny this is to adopt relativism about truth. For example, “pi 
equals 3.14” could be strictly true in the grade-school classroom but false in the 
laboratory. This view can seem versatile and appealing. Moreover, relativism could be on 
strong footing in some domains, such as morality (Harman 1975) or justification (Wright 
2008). But the relativist response to skepticism must go beyond those domains to 
encompass all of the domains where we ordinarily take ourselves to know many things, 




such as arithmetical calculations or the size of household objects, as well as the domains 
of scientific inquiry. This option is unavailable to philosophers who, like us, reject truth 
relativism. It could be a failing of ours, but no matter how hard we try, we simply cannot 
bring ourselves to believe, or even find it plausible, that in some contexts it is strictly true 
that pi is 3.14, or that it could be strictly true that we added 16 ounces to the mix (when in 
fact only 15.90 ounces was added). Later we will propose an alternative that avoids these 
consequences while matching truth relativism’s appealing versatility. 
 Another way to deny that approximations are not strictly true is to deny that the 
representations in question are ever precise enough to count as false. When it comes to 
historical dates, for example, it is strictly true that the American Civil War ended in 1865. 
So long as the content is imprecise enough to encompass the margin of error, strict truth 
can be preserved. Thus, there is nothing in the factive account that rules out the 
possibility of knowing that Civil War ended in 1865, or even in April of 1865, even if I 
don’t know that it ended on April 9, 1865. Similarly, our visual representations of where 
the mailbox is located might not be 2 feet, but rather the distance between my two 
outstretched hands, wiggling them a bit, which is about 2 feet from the curb. If 
representations are coarse-grained enough in these or other ways, the response goes, then 
they are coarse enough to count as strictly true. 
 This strategy is promising but also can be questioned. It is an empirical question 
what the precise granularity of our representations is. As far as we’re aware, this has not 
been established, even approximately, by researchers in the cognitive sciences. Thus, a 
coarse-grained account of representation is no better empirically supported than a find-
grained account, and it is an open question whether the present strategy succeeds. It is 




hostage to how the science turns out. In principle, there is nothing wrong with the issue 
ultimately hinging on how the science turns out, but, as discussed more below, we think 
that progress can be made independently of that. 
A third response to the skeptical challenge accepts the conclusion but denies its 
force. Ordinary claims about everyday knowledge are false, but versions of them could be 
constructed that are true by including hedges and elliptical approximation clauses. For 
example, when it comes to knowledge of distance or time, we know only the approximate 
distance or the approximate time, such as “the age of the universe, give or take millions 
of years.” Similarly, when we say false things like “Smith knows that his mailbox is 2 
feet from the street,” perhaps what we really mean to say is that Smith knows the 
approximate proposition “that his mailbox is about 2 feet from the street.” Restructuring 
our speech in these ways might even make knowing how old the universe is or where my 
mailbox is possible in virtue of knowing only the approximate proposition. 
Such qualifications might also explain epistemic practices in some special 
domains such as scientific inquiry. Scientific inquiry might aim to uncover truth, but it 
typically does no better than uncover approximate rather than exact truths. When 
speculating about what scientists believe, Alvin Goldman, for instance, writes that “the 
sort of proposition they typically believe is not one expressed by a formula ‘F,’ but one 
with the content ‘F, to some approximation” (Goldman 1999: 246). If this is true, then 
knowledge of (specific, unqualified) truths about the world is ruled out, while 
approximate propositions remain candidates for scientific knowledge. A related but 
distinct research program in philosophy of science emphasizes the use of laws, idealized 
models, “felicitous falsehoods,” and “cognitively useful fictions” in scientific inquiry. 




Catherine Elgin, for instance, argues that strictly false propositions can often increase our 
scientific understanding of natural phenomena and thus explain the epistemic legitimacy 
of science in the face of the kind of skepticism implied by the argument above (Elgin 
2004).1 
While perhaps allowing us to retain some everyday or scientific knowledge and 
offering a path to recovering some ersatz knowledge, this response still comes with a 
cost. While most everyday knowledge claims could be made true, they still are false. 
Even scientific inquiry, arguably one of the best ways to acquire knowledge of the 
physical world, is necessarily limited to knowledge of qualified approximate truths. In 
fairness, this is exactly how the proposal was billed: the skeptic is right but it needn’t 
matter. Perhaps this is ultimately the best that can be done. However, we think that it is 
premature to settle for this without first considering at least one other strategy. 
We propose a fourth response: knowledge does not require truth (i.e. reject line 
1). Instead, false but approximately true propositions can be known. Call this the 
approximation account of knowledge. On this view, representations need not be true in 
order to count as knowledge. Instead, they need only adequately represent the truth. 
Though there are potentially many ways that approximations could be adequate, one way 
is for them to serve our purposes well enough to facilitate action and help us to achieve 
our goals in a particular circumstance. For example, 3.14 might be adequate, and hence 
 
 
1 We thank a reviewer for discussion on these points. 




known, as the value of pi in the grade school classroom, but inadequate, and hence not 
known, as the value of pi in the lab engineering a global positioning system. 
The approximation account avoids the questions associated with the other 
responses considered above. Unlike the first response, the approximation account does 
not rely on unrealistic assumptions about measuring devices or human cognition. Unlike 
the second response, the approximation account preserves the link between knowing, on 
the one hand, and commonsense norms and standards of communication and inquiry, on 
the other. Relatedly, the approximation account does not imply that most of our ordinary 
knowledge claims are false, nor that speaking truthfully about these matters requires 
ubiquitous hedging. Unlike the second response considered above, the approximation 
account does not endorse relativism about truth. On our proposal, truth is perfectly 
objective. Surely something has to give in response to the skeptical challenge. But instead 
of giving up on objective truth, we could give up on truth as a requirement of knowledge. 
We propose in its place a standard for judging approximations that relativizes to practical 
purposes. This entails that a representation might be adequate relative to one practical 
context, but inadequate relative to another. It is important to emphasize that, on our 
proposal, this is not because it is true in one context but false in the other. Instead, it is 
because, trivially, the demands of successful action depend on features of the practical 
context, which are not always the same. We submit that exploiting the unobjectionable 
relativity of practical adequacy is theoretically preferable to resorting to relativism about 
truth. 
It is also important to emphasize that our proposal does not sever the conceptual 
connection between knowledge and truth. One virtue of all three proposals considered 




earlier is that they preserve an intuitive link between knowledge and truth. The 
approximation account has this virtue too, in at least two ways. On the one hand, 
conceptually, truth sets the standard by which approximations are judged worthy or not. 
Truth anchors the tolerable margin for error. On the other hand, an ideal instance of 
knowledge will be strictly true. We can allow that as the constituent representation more 
closely approximates the strict truth, the better the knowledge becomes. Other things 
being equal, improving a representation’s accuracy means that you know better. In the 
limit, as a representation’s precision increases indefinitely while still remaining strictly 
true, it would be adequate for any practical purposes. 
Aside from providing a direct response to the skeptical argument, another strength 
of our proposal is that it coheres well with prior theoretical developments in 
epistemology. For instance, the approximation account naturally coheres with the theory 
that knowledge is importantly connected to action and practical interests (Fantl and 
McGrath 2009; Hawthorne 2004; James 1879 (1948); Locke 1690 (1975); Turri and 
Buckwalter 2017; Turri, Buckwalter, and Rose 2016). According to such views, whether 
a proposition is known depends partially on whether it is appropriate to treat that 
proposition as a reason for action in a particular situation. If actionability is a component 
of knowledge, and reliance on approximate truths can often be appropriate or even 
practically necessary to facilitate action, then it is reasonable to integrate approximate 
truths into pragmatic accounts of knowledge. 
Pursuant to that thought, in a certain respect, the approximation account is the 
antithesis of the Cartesian view. At the end of Meditation One, in the context of justifying 
his method of hyperbolic doubt, Descartes considers an objection: even if our senses are 




“in some respects doubtful,” isn’t it nevertheless more reasonable to trust rather than 
distrust them? Descartes responds, “It is impossible for me to indulge in too much 
distrust, since I am now concentrating only on knowledge, not on action” (Descartes 
1641: 12). On Descartes’ approach, one can set action aside when theorizing about 
knowledge, at least in its ideal form. On our approach, far from being able to set action 
aside, one achieves ideal knowledge only when the constituent representation is precise 
and accurate enough to inform action in any practical context. Rather than being 
separable from action, ideal knowledge is partly defined by its connection to action 
across an indefinite range of situations. 
This definition coheres with recent work on epistemic normativity and the 
epistemic conditions on practical reasoning. Michael Shaffer, for example, argues that it 
is epistemically rational to employ certain kinds of false propositions in practical 
reasoning so long as they are approximately true, and that “we can be efficient problem 
solvers and deliberators even though we do not reason in maximally accurate ways on the 
basis of exact truths” (Shaffer 2012: 250). We agree with this basic observation. But, in 
contrast, we suggest that one straightforward explanation for why this behavior can be 
rational is because some approximate truths can be known. 
The approximation account could also cohere with some versions of 
contextualism. According to David Lewis, for example, “S knows that p iff S’s evidence 
eliminates every possibility in which not-p — Psst! — except for those possibilities that 
we are properly ignoring” (Lewis 1996: 554). The context of the attribution distinguishes 
epistemically relevant from irrelevant possibilities of error. When deciding what a subject 
knows, only the relevant possibilities need ruled out by a subject’s evidence in order for 




an attributor to ascribe knowledge. For Lewis, the factivity of knowledge is guaranteed 
by the further “rule of actuality”, according to which, “the actual world is never properly 
ignored” (ibid.). One way to unpack this, we submit, is that the way things actually are is 
a fixed point from which a practically acceptable margin of error is established. We can 
properly ignore error possibilities that fall in the gap between strict truth and the outer 
limits of practically adequate approximation. Future research is necessary to explore 
whether the approximation account is best executed with mechanisms developed by 
contextualists, interest relative invariantists, or others. For present purposes, however, we 
think the prospect that it could be readily accommodated by several leading accounts of 
knowledge adds to its plausibility and further motivates the proposal. 
Finally, we would be remiss if we failed to remark upon a curious and ironically 
useful consequence of our proposal. We propose abandoning the mainstream view that 
knowledge requires truth and replacing it with the view that knowledge requires merely 
an adequate approximation of the truth. Moreover, we argued for this in the context of a 
skeptical challenge that, as far as we’re aware, has received little if any attention in 
contemporary epistemology. Thus it could turn out that, with respect to the contexts in 
which the theory of knowledge is typically pursued, the view that knowledge requires 
truth is an adequate approximation of the true view that knowledge requires not truth but 
merely adequate approximation. In other words, by our own lights, it is possible that 
proponents of the false mainstream view know that it is true! We submit that this is an 
excellent explanation of the mainstream view’s appeal. 
In summary, we considered a skeptical challenge that arises in light of a condition 
that is widely accepted as a necessary condition of knowledge: truth. If knowledge 




requires truth, then the fact that many of our beliefs are false threatens skepticism. We 
view the main contribution of this paper to be isolating the skeptical challenge for factive 
knowledge, reviewing several responses to this challenge, and hopefully, inspiring more 
nuance in future theorizing on factivity constraints on knowledge in light of it. To that 
end, we also proposed a new response to the skeptical challenge and theory of our own: 
relinquishing the truth requirement on knowledge and allowing adequate approximations 
to be known. This response addresses the skeptical challenge, avoids questions facing 
other responses, retains a conceptual connection between knowledge and truth, coheres 
with several other developments in theoretical epistemology, and can explain the 
widespread appeal of the view that knowledge requires truth. 
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